Backgrounder

Safety communications related to TSB investigation M21P0030: February 2021 sinking of the tug Ingenika in British Columbia

The occurrence

On 10 February 2021, while towing a loaded barge in the Gardner Canal near Kemano Bay, British Columbia, the tug Ingenika encountered adverse weather conditions which impacted its ability to tow and maintain speed, and eventually led to the vessel taking on water. The master and the two deckhands that were onboard were able to exit the sinking vessel, however only one was able to swim and climb aboard the life raft. Search and rescue resources located the sole surviving crew member on land approximately 10 hours later.

Safety communications

Safe operation of tugs of 15 gross tonnage or less

On 10 February 2021, the tug Ingenika, with 3 crew members on board, was towing the loaded barge Miller 204 in the Gardner Canal when the tug sank approximately 16 nautical miles west‑southwest of Kemano Bay, British Columbia (BC). The barge subsequently drifted and went aground about 2.5 nautical miles southwest from where the tug sank. The search and rescue operation located 1 surviving crew member on land and recovered the bodies of the 2 other crew members from the water. The barge was recovered; the tug was not found. At the time of the occurrence, the tug had 3500 L of diesel fuel in tanks on board.

Regulatory surveillance for tugs of 15 gross tonnage or less

At September 2022, there were approximately 1343 tugs of 15 GT or less registered in Canada, approximately 1035 of which were registered in BC. Since 2015, the TSB has investigated 6 occurrences involving tugs of 15 GT or less operating on the west coast of Canada that have raised issues around the adequacy of regulatory surveillance. ^{Footnote 1}

TC does not certify tugs of 15 GT or less, nor are these vessels required to undergo regular inspections. By comparison, before being certified by TC under the Vessel Safety Certificates Regulations, tugs of greater than 15 GT but of less than 150 GT are required to be inspected every 4 years, and tugs of 150 GT and greater are required to be inspected annually. Although TC has set an annual target of inspecting 3% of tugs of 15 GT or less nationwide, most will go years between inspections and may never be inspected over the life of the vessel. For example, the Ingenika was built in 1968 and had been in operation for over 50 years before this occurrence; the investigation found that there were no records of TC performing an inspection at any point in the tug’s operational life.

The TSB also recently investigated another occurrence involving a tug of 15 GT or less, the Risco Warrior,^{Footnote 2} which was built in 1961 and had never been inspected. That investigation found that, in the absence of comprehensive regulatory surveillance and enforcement, there is a risk that tugs of 15 GT or less will continue to be operated with unsafe equipment and operating practices. While vessel owners and operators have the primary responsibility to manage safety, it is vital that TC provide effective oversight and proactively intervene to ensure that vessel owners and operators comply with regulations and standards and can manage the safety of their operations effectively.

From April to October 2022, TC conducted 30 risk-based monitoring inspections of tugs of 15 GT or less. Overall, 21 of these inspections resulted in a total of 62 deficiencies, including 13 related to lifesaving equipment, 12 related to structure or stability, 8 related to crew certificates, 6 related to fire safety, and 5 related to navigation safety.

From April to October 2022, TC also conducted 120 statutory inspections of tugs of greater than 15 GT. Sixty-four of these inspections resulted in the identification of deficiencies. Statutory inspections are generally more comprehensive than risk-based monitoring inspections. In addition, TC conducted 30 risk-based monitoring inspections of tugs of greater than 15 GT on the basis of findings from the statutory inspections. Of these 30 risk-based monitoring inspections, 19 resulted in the identification of deficiencies.

In 2018–19, TC conducted a concentrated inspection campaign on domestic vessels. According to the campaign report, ^{Footnote 3} 83 vessels were inspected nationwide, 49 of which were inspected under the annual inspection category and 34 through quadrennial inspections per the Hull Inspection Regulations. ^{Footnote 4} Nineteen of the vessels inspected were tugs, but none were of 15 GT or less. The data showed that vessels inspected every 4 years had more deficiencies than those inspected annually.

TC also focused on tugs in a concentrated inspection campaign conducted in BC from January to March 2017. Thirty tugs of 15 GT or less and 30 tugs of greater than 15 GT were selected for inspection. TC concluded that tugs of 15 GT or less had significantly more instances of regulatory non-compliance than tugs of greater than 15 GT. ^{Footnote 5}

For tugs of 15 GT or less, the onus is on the authorized representative (AR) to ensure compliance with the regulations and the safe operation of the vessel. However, in its Watchlist 2022, the TSB highlighted that many ARs of small vessels, such as the Ingenika, have limited awareness of key sections of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and of the broader regulatory framework. Other ARs may not be motivated to comply with regulations, given that it is well known that TC is unlikely to inspect their vessels and so the probability of enforcement is low.

Recognizing the level of risk present, in 2016, the Board issued a safety concern^{Footnote 6} on the issue of regulatory surveillance for tugs of 15 GT or less. On 25 June 2022, TC pre-published the proposed Marine Safety Management System Regulations, which will require tugs of 15 GT or less to develop a safety management system and obtain a Canadian safety management certificate. TC also developed and implemented the Small Vessel Compliance Program for Tugs (SVCP-T), which provides a simplified description of regulatory requirements and useful information that companies and ARs can use to evaluate their regulatory compliance. Although these are encouraging initiatives, neither are a replacement for vessel inspections under a broader program of regulatory surveillance, which would provide an opportunity to examine a vessel and its equipment to verify that it is in compliance with the regulatory requirements and being operated safely. Without adequate surveillance by TC, shortcomings in the safety management and operations of tugs of 15 GT or less will continue to go unaddressed, leading to accidents. Therefore, the Board recommends that

Risk assessments for tugs of 15 gross tonnage or less

The TSB has noted that, in addition to the need for regulatory surveillance for tugs of 15 GT or less, there is currently no requirement for towing companies operating these tugs to assess any of the risks that might be present in their operations, even when it comes to something as essential as assessing the suitability of their tugs for the towing operations they are undertaking. Although the present investigation focused on tugs of 15 GT or less, it was noted that there are also no requirements for risk assessments for tugs of greater than 15 GT.

Although the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 requires the AR of any vessel to develop safe operating procedures and requires the master to ensure the safety of the vessel and anyone on board, what constitutes safe operating procedures is open to interpretation, and these requirements have not resulted in the effective management of risk on tugs of 15 GT or less. Combined with the fact that tugs in this category go largely uninspected and have no restrictions on their operations, there is the potential for accidents like the one involving the Ingenika to occur.

Requirements for risk assessment do exist for some towing vessels; TC requires a risk assessment to be performed when a vessel is towing a vessel carrying oil or dangerous chemicals in bulk. ^{Footnote 7} These types of risk assessments provide an opportunity to look at each aspect of the towing operation, such as the weather, hazards posed by the cargo, and suitability of the tug for the tow. TC’s recently developed SVCP-T ^{Footnote 8} also provides useful data that can be used in risk assessments to support safe towing operations.

Since the occurrence involving the Ingenika, TC has taken some initiatives to improve tug safety through the development of the SVCP-T and the pre-publication of the proposed Marine Safety Management System Regulations in the Canada Gazette, Part I. The proposed regulations, in particular, give TC an opportunity to develop regulatory provisions to ensure that companies operating tugs of 15 GT or less incorporate risk assessments into their operations. However, although the SVCP-T and the proposed regulations are positive steps forward, in their present forms, they do not explicitly require tug operators to conduct risk assessments. This means that risks in towing operations will continue to go undetected and unmitigated, placing crews, tugs, tows, and the environment in danger. Therefore, the Board recommends that

Pacific Pilotage Authority oversight of pilotage waivers

At the time of the occurrence, the Ingenika was operating in a compulsory pilotage area that falls under the responsibility of the Pacific Pilotage Authority (PPA). The PPA is a Crown corporation that has a mandate to establish, operate, maintain, and administer safe and efficient pilotage services in British Columbia. Pilotage services are provided by licensed pilots, who are highly trained navigators that use their knowledge of local waters to direct a vessel and navigate it using the safest route.

The PPA has a pilotage waiver system under which some vessels, mainly tugs, may obtain waivers that exempt them from having to take a licensed pilot on board in designated pilotage areas if the operators and tugs meet certain requirements. However, when a company requests a pilotage waiver, the PPA does not check the information submitted to ensure that it meets regulatory requirements, and the PPA relies on operators to ensure that they are complying with waiver conditions once a waiver is granted. In BC, there are currently 364 tugs, owned by 85 different companies, that operate under pilotage waivers.

This investigation identified that, although the master of the Ingenika had been issued a pilotage waiver, he held a certificate of competency that was restricted to passenger vessels operated by a specific company and therefore should not have been eligible for a waiver on a towing vessel. As well, one of the deckhands had, on various occasions, been put in charge of a navigational watch on board the Ingenika, but he did not hold a certificate of competency or a pilotage waiver. Further, the tug was not fitted with a bridge navigational watch alarm system and did not have a Class A automatic identification system, both of which are requirements for a vessel operating under a waiver.

This investigation is not the first to identify shortcomings around the PPA’s process for issuing waivers and its reliance on companies to ensure ongoing compliance with waiver conditions. The TSB found similar issues in occurrences involving the tug Ocean Monarch^{Footnote 9} in 2017and the tug Nathan E. Stewart^{Footnote 10} in 2016.

Without an effective process to verify that crew members and vessels meet PPA waiver requirements, there is a risk that non-compliance with waiver requirements will go undetected and compromise safety in compulsory pilotage waters. Given the need to ensure that waivered vessels are operating at a level of safety comparable to that afforded by a licensed pilot, the Board recommends that